Towards dealing with multinationals by Seidman, Ann
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Seidman Research Papers Workshops, Notes and Papers
Towards dealing with
multinationals
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/29874
Boston University
1 
TOWARDS DEALING WITH MULTINATIONALS 
By Ann Seidman 
I. By analysing of role of multinational corporations (MNCs} in 
the context of the changing international division of labor can 
lay the foundation for dealing them as a key aspect of a strategy 
to escape Africa's crisis( 1}: 
A.Since independence, in context of historically shaped 
export orientation of African countries, MNCs have bought 
cheap raw materials, sold surplus manufactures to narrow 
high income market, and extracted major shares of their 
investable surplus: 
1. Taking advantage of African economies' competition 
with each other and other third world countries in 
exporting raw materials, MNCs profit from low export 
prices and worsening terms of trade: 
a. After World War II, MNCs shifted from ownership 
and even from buying from local estate owners to 
purchasing peasant-produced export crops: 
(1} EG shift from estate agriculture of eg 
Latin American coffee, Asian tea to African 
growers 
(2} beneficiaries = MNCs: 
eg tobacco: 1980 comparative study showed: a} 
1,200 settler farm owners in Zimbabwe kept 
Rejecting the ends-means approach too often adopted by 
positivist development theories, the approach here adopted 
employs a problem-solving methodology that involves the following 
four steps: 1} Explicitly define and provide evidence of the 
particular characteristics of the problem or difficulty of 
concern; 2} Test the range of explanatory hypotheses suggested 
by alternative theories against the available evidence to 
identify the causes of the problem which must be surmounted to 
solve it; 3} Examine the range of proposals for solution 
suggested by the explanatory hypothesis most consistent with the 
available evidence in terms of the constraints and resources to 
determine which will most likely succeed; 4} monitor the 
consequences of implementing the solution, starting the process 
over again to overcome the new problems that will inevitably 
emerge. For discussion of the problem-solving methodology in 
Africa, see D. Kalyalya, K. Mhlanga, A. Seidman and J. Semboja, 
Aid and Development (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1986} Ch. 
2. 
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roughly half of nation's gross tobacco income 
themselves, paying 76,000 farm workers about 
16%, while government received 5% in taxes, 
and BAT, Rothmans (SA-based) and TA holdings 
(US linked) got rest; 
b) BAT discovered that peasants grew crops 
cheaper, since grew their own foodstuffs, low 
overheads; in collaboration with independent 
governments, encouraged growth throughout 
continent (without concern for known health 
hazards, encouraged smoking habit, too ) 
b. In mines, MNCs welcomed independent 
governments' purchase of shares in mines, 
(1) MNCs retained control of management, 
technology, and most important, global 
marketing and processing (in their factories 
at home required to sell minerals to final 
buyers) 
(2) Government ownership reduced MNC risk of 
capital, and freed them to shop around for 
lowest bidder as third world countries 
competed to expand output, pushing down 
mineral price: 
(a) When MNCs owned mines, they 
cooperated among each other to restrict 
output, keep prices up (eg in copper: 5 
major MNCs in Zambia, Zaire, Chile, Peru 
controlled world market). 
(b) When governments acquired shares, 
all sought to expand exports to raise 
foreign exchange and revenues, 
increasing supply in face of limited 
world market; prices collapsed (copper 
is only one eg; even, despite OPEC), 
eventually, that happened in oil. 
(3) Note: In US, mine companies similarly 
began to get rid of real estate: 
eg in Arizona, AMAX sold housing (long 
since fully paid for) to workers, told 
them to accept wage cuts to meet 
•overseas' competition; if workers 
struck, could close plant (long since 
depreciated) with little or no loss 
2. Precise data on MNC drain of investable surplus = 
hard to get; 
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a. Available evidence suggests it is myth that 
Africa does not generate enough investable surplus 
to initiate development; what happens is that MNCs 
drain a major share abroad (more than equivalent 
to all the investments and loans African countries 
receive! 
b. Aggregate official reports of data relating to 
US investments in Africa illustrate the extent of 
the direct drain of profits from MNC investments; 
(1) US MNCs became relative newcomers in 
Africa after World War II: Their investments 
in Africa more than doubled from 1965 to 1985 
as they either collaborated with British and 
French firms, or displaced them (as had 
earlier in Latin America) 
(2) US MNC "investment income" ie profits, 
interest, dividends -- shipped out of Africa, 
excluding South Africa, in 20 years, 1965-
85: (2 
(a) outpaced new US investments 
(including reinvested earnings) in 
Africa (excluding South Africa) by an 
$565 million a year - ie every year, 
MNCs took an average of $565 million 
more out of the independent African 
countries than they put in. 
(b) The actual amount MNCs extracted 
each year increased as their investments 
rose; in the crisis year of 1984, for 
example, MNCs took out $1,678 million = 
their total investment in Africa 
(outside South Africa) in 1964. 
(c) In 1965-1985 period, MNCs drained a 
total of $11.3 billion out of Africa 
2 Source: Calculated from official aggregates reported by 
United states Department of Commerce and the Bureau of the 
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, annual) for relevant years. 
Note: In 1987, the Department of Commerce altered its method of 
presenting the data, making it much more difficult to estimate 
the annual total of funds drained away by MNCs. 
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outside South Africa, that is, two and a 
half times the as much their total 
investment remaining in Africa 
(excluding South Africa) in 1986: $4,263 
million. 
(3) Since US MNCs = relative newcomers, 
their investments and associated drain of 
surplus presumably constitutes smaller than 
British and French. 
(a) If just tripled US MNCs' drain to 
represent British-French MNCs' 
additional income taken out of 
independent African countries (ie = 
underestimated), average annual loss of 
investable surplus to MNCs would reach 
at least $1695 million exceeding all 
us investment in 1965 
(b) Multiplied by 20, that suggests 
investable surplus drained by MNCs from 
independent African countries from 1965 
to 1985 reached at least $33,900 million 
-- enough to finance major balanced, 
integrated industrial development 
throughout the continent. 
c. Transfer pricing and other forms of extracting 
surpluses constituted another form of indirect 
drain of independent African countries' investable 
surplus: 
(1)= difficult to detect, but became more 
common as African governments attained 
independence, and increased taxes or acquired 
shares in MNC factories or mines, or as more 
peasants engaged in export crop cultivation: 
(2) Estimates suggest that, every year, Third 
World countries lose 10%-15% of value of 
foreign trade through transfer pricing(3 ); 
Assuming a minimum 10% loss of 
investable surplus through MNC transfer 
pricing, the 40 low-income countries 
(excluding China and India, but 
including the 26 poorest African states) 
3 See R. Murray, Multinationals Beyond The Market, (New 
York: Wiley, 1981) for discussion of techniques. 
lost a total of almost $19,758 million 
in 1987, alone-- exceeding by almost a 
third all the foreign assistance 
($14,819 million ) they all received 
that year (4 ). 
(3) two Egs of "indirect" drain of Africans' 
investable surplus: 
(a) Mining: 
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i) When Anglo and AMAX sold 51% of 
mines to Zambia, government, 
seeking expanded investment, 
permitted them to take out $1 
profit without paying tax on it for 
every dollar invested; so Anglo 
borrowed $ (which mine company, 
half government owned, had to help 
pay out of future profits) and 
shipped past profits home without 
tax 
ii) Mining companies "Costs of 
production" rose an unexplained 20% 
-- cutting reported mine profits, 
and likely reflecting a process of 
transfer pricing that shifted those 
profits abroad, unreported and 
untaxed. 
iii) Anglo American used profits 
from Zambia and those it took out 
of Rhodesia to finance MINORCO in 
Bermuda; reinvested in US to become 
second largest foreign investor 
there (including mining interests, 
oil, finance, etc.) 
(b) In tobacco, MNCs sold finished 
products (cigarettes, etc) in the United 
States for 10 times the price paid for 
leaf purchased from growers; 
that is, for every $1 earned by 
African country (however divided 
4 Source: Calculated from World Bank, World Development 
Report, 1989 - Financial Systems and Development, World 
Development Indicators (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
Tables 14 and 20, pp. 190 and 202. 
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between farm owners and workers), 
the sale of tobacco products reaped 
$10 in the US (roughly half of that 
went in taxes to US federal and 
state governments -- a case of 
Third World tobacco growers' 
subsidizing US government) 
B. After World War II MNCs shifted patterns of investment in 
Third World economies from primarily raw materials to 
include labor-intensive manufactures, enhancing global 
profits by taking advantage of growing pools of unemployed 
labor desperate for jobs at any wage: 
1. Early post-WWII expansion in Carribean, Mexico, 
Central America, Brazil; later in Asia: 
a. Note: earlier shift south in US of textile, 
shoe, electrical appliances, (even us Steel went 
to Birmingham in l920s=Pittsburgh of the South), 
from New England to US South; effect of slavery, 
post-civil war sharecropping pulled southern wages 
down to 1/3 less than the north's; and southern 
governments offered all tax breaks, industrial 
zones, anti-union legislation, etc., now offered 
by Third World countries 
b. After World War II, MNCs moved further south to 
set up factories in Third World: 
(1) took advantage of wages 1/4 of those in 
US; note undemocratic governments provided 
"labor discipline", eg in Dominican Republic, 
Haiti, Brazil 
(2) MNCs increasingly changed form of 
investment, contracting with local factory 
owners (as had begun to do in agricultural 
and mineral exports), avoiding risks of 
capital and at any time could shift to still 
lower cost producers: 
(a) Sold machinery, equipment, materials 
(=market for surplus MNC manufactures) ; 
(b) Bought finished shoes, textiles, 
toys, electronic parts and equipment 
note: 2/3 of labor on hi tech 
products = unskilled, low paid) 
(c) Make profits via sale of 
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technology, finance, and marketing 
of finished products; sometimes 
(not always) provide management 
expertise for high fees. 
c. Expansion in Asia: The "little dragons" 
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(1) Korean and Vietnam war provided growing 
knowledge about investment conditions, 
expanding markets with direct and indirect US 
government support ($billions in military 
spending) especially = markets for military-
related high tech/electronics, 
In l960s-70s, world market expanded at 
8% a year; now growing at less than 3% a 
year, while competitive expansion of 
Third World manufactured exports is 
creating oversupply, forcing prices down 
(as formerly with raw materials, 
minerals) 
(2) "Little dragons" seemed centers of 
stability: authoritarian governments backed 
by British or us military support 
(a) MNCs opened financial and marketing 
headquarters in Hong Kong & Singapore, 
some labor intensive factories; MNC oil 
refineries in Singapore -- 1/3 of 
"manufactures" -- provided control of 
markets for Southeast Asian oil; 
(b) From headquarters on these islands, 
MNCs spread into larger neighboring 
countries for raw materials, minerals, 
and low cost labor for manufacturing 
i) After 1978 reforms, in China 
with 1 billion population and 
growing unemployment, eager to 
enter world competition -- real 
wages faid by MNCs= 1/20 of those 
in US( ; manufacturing goods sold 
to MNCs through Hong Kong 
(c) Taiwan and South Korea: 
i) Larger internal labor force than 
China Business Review 
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Singapore or Hong Kong, {20, 40 
million population, respectively), 
major US military support, plus 
growing us investment, seconded 
(and perhaps now outpaced) by Japan 
ii) Note: Undemocratic = control of 
labor, martial law backed by 
military; skewed income 
distribution, with real poverty of 
wage workers 
iii) Instability/fragility of 
dependence on competitive exports; 
eg s Korea's growing foreign 
debt (4th largest in 3rd 
World) requires debt service 
=30%; if loses in competition 
as MNCs shift to lower wage 
areas, s. Korea may look more 
like Brazil's failed "miracle" 
2. MNC shift to labor intensive manufacturing in Africa 
has taken place more slowly 
a. Like "little dragons" South Africa emerged as 
regional subcenter of MNC manufacturing investment 
in southern Africa (an area 3X size of US, with 
100 million population): 
(1) By 1980s, 3/4 of US MNC manufacturing 
investment in Africa was in South Africa; 
(a) similar pattern of other European 
MNC investors 
(b) Japanese laws prohibited direct 
investment, but invested through US and 
other firms, and by contracting with 
South African firms, providing 
technology, imported parts and materials 
and reaping share of profits as payment. 
(2) Reasons: 
(a) Labor control via apartheid system = 
low wages, labor discipline; 
(b) Neighboring countries provided 
reservoir of low cost labor, Raw 
materials, and markets 
(c) Low taxes since didn't pay for 
social services/black majority; 
(d) Racism: Reflected in us MNCs 
shifting from US south to South Africa; 
eg. head of North Carolina 
Commercial Bank (NCNB - a major 
regional US bank), a former US 
marine explicitly praised SA's 
apartheid environment economy 
(3) South Africa's alleged "miracle growth" 
collapsed in crisis of '80s: economic impact 
aggravated by (and accelerated emergence of) 
liberation struggle 
(4) MNC divestment: partly in response to 
sanctions, but also = shift to new MNC 
pattern of contractual relations: less risk, 
greater flexibility to take advantage of 
competing manufacturing industries elsewhere 
in Third World 
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(a) Ironically, Taiwanese capital set up 
almost 100 factories in SA bantustans to 
take advantage of even lower wages 
there; sold under "made-in-Taiwan" 
labels to global retailers (Sears, K-
Mart) = evade sanctions. 
b. Smaller sub-Saharan regional subcenters in 
former colonial settler areas - eg Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast: 
(1) MNCs welcomed government participation in 
shares in accord with their new world wide 
investment pattern: 
(2) Primarily import substitution industries: 
(a) MNCs sought access to African 
markets; apparently MNC managers feared 
independent governments would not 
maintain labor discipline, skills, 
needed to enter global competition. 
(b) Typical consequences of import 
substitution industries everywhere in 
Third World: 
i) Manufactured luxuries, semi-
luxury goods primarily for narrow 
high income group (some broadly 
consumed items like beer, 
cigarettes) ; did not manufacture 
tools and equipment to increase 
productivity throughout African 
economies; 
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ii) Imported machinery, equipment 
and materials = cost scarce foreign 
exchange; 
iii) capital intensive = little 
employment; 
iv) located in export enclaves, 
aggravating uneven development; 
v) didn't use local resources, 
undermined existing smaller 
handicrafts industry that had used 
local resources and provided jobs 
(3) Little emphasis on export industry, tho 
more in '80s: 
(a) eg. In 1980s, in Zimbabwe, 
international agencies (World Bank, IMF) 
advised shift to export-oriented 
industry; to compete in world market, 
should devalue, hold line on wages 
(4) Crisis of '80s stifled further industrial 
growth in independent African states: 
(a) Falling export earnings: independent 
African economies couldn't afford 
imported inputs so industries operated 
at levels far below capacity, 
aggravating domestic scarcities and 
raising prices 
(b) Devaluation to increase 
"international competitiveness:" 
i) further reduced capacity to 
import essential machinery, parts 
and materials for industries; 
ii) Aggravated competition between 
African countries, hindering 
efforts to achieve regional 
cooperation for industrial 
development. 
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(c) IMF, IBRD policies requiring the 
"opening of markets" to MNC 
manufacturing firms operating elsewhere 
(including South Africa) contributed to 
deindustrialization; Illustrated by 
Zimbabwe examples 
i) eg. Zimbabwe government's 
permission to MNCs to import 
machinery, equipment and parts 
(with DC government export-
financing) replaced items formerly 
manufactured by local (white-
owned) industries during UDI 
ii) eg World Bank financing of 
Hwangwe Thermal Plant required 
bidding for boilers (tho Zimbabwe 
manufacturer could make them using 
Zimbabwe steel and labor); a 
British MNC won bid, (I believe MNC 
built the boiler in SA!). 
(d) As sought to continue essential 
imports and attractive investment 
climates (via low no taxes on profits, 
etc) these would-be African "little 
dragons" had borrowed heavily abroad, 
becoming burdened by debt service ratios 
among the highest in Africa (See below) 
c. In late 1970s MNCs shift to bank loans, rather than 
direct investments, another feature of changed MNC strategy 
from direct investment and ownership of real estate (whether 
agriculture, mines or factories) to indirect control through 
management, marketing, technology and finance: 
1. SubSaharan African countries, which in 1980 
received barely 10% of all foreign investment in 
developing countries, received a still smaller 
fraction -- only about 8% of the declining total 
in 1987. Its share of official grants rose 
slightly from 33% to 36% of a larger total. 
Table: Selected capital flows to developing countries, 
1981 and 1987 
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Country group: Total Official Foreign direct 
grants investment 
---------- ---------- ------------
1981 1987 1981 1987 1981 1987 
-------------------
----- ------
All developing 
countries 24.5 30.4 14.5 20.0 10.2 9.5 
Sub-Saharan Africa 7.1 11.1 4.9 7.3 1.3 0.8 
Middle-inc. Asia 1.8 2.2 0.9 1.5 1.8 2.5 
Low-inc. Asia 5.3 7.2 2.7 3.5 0.2 1.3 
Europe, Mid-East & 
North Africa 8.2 6.3 5.1 5.0 1.3 0.8 
Latin America & 
caribbean 2.1 3.6 0.9 2.7 5.6 4.1 
Source: World Development Report, 1989 Financial Systems and 
Development, world Development Indicators (New York: Oxford 
University Press for World Bank, 1989) Table 1.3, p. 23. 
2. SubSaharan Africa increased its external debt by 
almost four times, (other low and middle income 
countries increased their foreign debt about six 
times.) 
a. Debt service = new form of MNC finance 
capital's drain of African's investable surplus: 
(1) In 1970, on average, SubSaharan African 
countries spent $5.3 out of every hundred 
they earned in foreign exchange for their 
exports to service their foreign debt; 
(2) In 1987 they spent, $14.7, almost three 
times as much, 
(3) Individual African countries paid far 
more: (note * = budding MNC regional 
subcenters) : 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
(h) 
(i) 
Ethiopia: 
*Kenya: 
Niger: 
Malawi: 
Senegal: 
*Zimbabwe: 
*Ivory coast: 
Congo: 
Gabon: 
$28.4 
$28.8 
$33.5 
$23.3 
$21.4 
$23.2 
$19.6 
$18.6 
$21.8 
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Note: For most of these countries, even 
Zimbabwe -- which started from near zero 
foreign debt in 1980 -- the 1987 debt service 
ratio exceeded the average ($22.0) for Low 
and middle income countries 
II. This analysis suggests a range of national and regional 
strategies for dealing with MNCs, along with areas of further 
research(6) required to work out the details and implement them: 
A. strengthen African governments' capacity to control and 
direct MNCs role to implement national and regional 
development plans: 
1. Lesson No. 1 derived from analysis in Part I: 
a. MNCs, seeking to maximize their global profits, 
take advantage of competitive efforts of 3rd world 
countries to expand exports and attract foreign 
investments; as a result, unless controlled, they 
aggravate the causes of poverty and oppression 
like those which culminated in crisis of the 80s; 
b. In Africa (as in other Third World countries), 
the state is THE only agency capable of 
representing national interests to direct MNC 
capital, managerial capacity, technology and 
market access in ways more likey to help overcome 
the poverty of African people: 
(1) No one else in African countries can 
shape national policies in order to bargain 
effectively: 
(a) small private African business 
cannot compete or protect their efforts 
to build domestically-oriented industry 
using local resources to provide local 
consumer and producer requirements; nor 
can they muster sufficient funds to 
build basic industries-- iron and steel, 
transport and energy, etc. 
(b) small African peasants cannot 
6. Space limitations here only permit indicating the key 
areas for research, but prohibit details. The detailed research 
agendas should, however, derive from the use of a problem-solving 
analysis of causes of the problem of concern in each case; see 
footnote #1 above. 
bargain effectively to protect their 
incomes 
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i) Even the colonial government 
established marketing boards to 
protect domestic farmers (settlers 
or peasants) against world price 
fluctuations 
(c) Workers cannot protect their wages 
and working conditions without 
government assistance via minimum wages, 
inspectorates, and control over prices 
(including exchange value of national 
currency) 
c. Therefor reject today's conventional 
wisdom/IMF, IBRD, that governments must withdraw, 
leaving economic development to private sector; in 
Africa as throughout the Third World, MNCs 
dominate private sector and, seeking to maximize 
their global profits without regard to national 
welfare, have aggravated all the factors that have 
caused Africa's crisis. 
2. Task is to use state and law to control framework 
within which MNCs invest, ensuring redirection of their 
role to national and regional development: 
a. Restructured state institutions must formulate 
and implement national plans: 
(1) to capture and redirect investable 
surpluses to finance national and regional 
physical plans for balanced industrial and 
agricultural development capable of providing 
increasingly productive employment for the 
continent's inhabitants; 
b. Will not here discuss obvious necessity of 
restructuring the state institutions to facilitate 
formulation and implementation of appropriate 
plans; 
(1) that is topic of another set of 
discussions at this conference; 
(2) have been writing book together with Bob 
Seidman on that subject,focusing on how to 
analyze inherited state structures to build 
new institutions more capable of implementing 
declared intentions of African governors( 7 ) 
to overcome the causes of the poverty and 
powerlessness of great majority of the 
continent's inhabitants (including those 
causes resulting from MNC behavior). 
(3) Emphasis: state is not a free good: 
15 
(a) even restructured, will operate with 
limited resources and serious 
constraints (including shortages of 
personnel, information, finance, etc.); 
must analyze these to determine what 
action state can take; 
(b) Given the state's limited resources, 
must decide: 
i) in which priority areas state 
must function (eg "commanding 
heights": banks and finance, 
foreign and internal trade, and 
basic industries including energy 
and transport (8 ) 
ii) how state can best function in 
those areas; 
(c) Given that MNCs may provide needed 
additional capital, managerial skills, 
technologies and access to markets, must 
discover ways to improve bargaining 
power to ensure they do in fact 
contribute to -- and do not undermine -
-national and regional plans. 
7 Here assume that those holding the reins of government 
really do represent national interests -- workers, peasants, 
small national business, professionals, and intellectuals -- who 
would benefit from restructuring the national economies to 
eliminate the crisis' underlying causes. Obviously this is not 
always the case, but contradictory features characteristic of 
every African government -- reflecting in part the contradictory 
class interests of the society -- permit key actors, if they have 
adequate knowledge, to make choices relating to the use of state 
power and the law which favor the national welfare as opposed to 
MNC interests. 
8 For discussion of why these constitute the "commanding 
heights" see A. Seidman, Planning in Subsaharan Africa" (Dar es 
Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House,l976) 
3. Specific proposals for dealing with MNCs in 
framework of national and regional plans: 
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a. 1982 conference in Zimbabwe on the topic of how 
to control MNCs, including economists and lawyers 
from most SADCC member states, formulated 
proposals for dealing with MNCs (see A. Seidman, 
R.B. Seidman, D.B. Ndlela and K. Makamure, eds, 
Transnationals in Southern Africa (Zimbabwe 
Publishing House, 1986) = range of proposals, 
focusing on 
(1) Negotiations, aid and loans from MNCs by 
individual governments to reduce competition 
among them and strengthen their bargaining 
positions; 
(2) Create institutions and train personnel 
to ensure that transfer technology from MNCs 
along with knowledge of how to adapt it to 
African circumstances, starting in priority 
sectors, to spread increasingly productive 
employment opportunities and rising living 
standards throughout national and regional 
economies. 
(3) Alternative government banking and 
financial policies to capture greater share 
of investable surpluses generated by MNC 
activities which African governments decide 
they cannot, themselves, manage; 
(4) National and regional investment codes 
to provide minimum standards for agreements 
reached through bargaining with MNCs -- a 
floor on which all African governments would 
build their negotiations with MNCs. 
b. Here, review and extend these proposals from 
southern African to Africa-wide context and modify 
them in light of nearly a decade of more analysis 
of MNCs and the crisis' impact: generated by past 
policies: 
(1) To improve negotiations with MNCs re 
investments and loans to overcome competition 
and strengthen African countries' 
cooperation: 
(a) at the national level, 
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i) establish a central unit to 
coordinate dealings with foreign 
investors to ensure consistency and 
build up government negotiation 
expertise; 
ii) Improve collection of 
information re foreign companies 
via detailed and regularly updated 
information re ownership, 
affiliates and parents; financial 
condition according to prescribed 
accounting standards; details of 
cash flows; details of companies' 
physical operations in country, 
including resources, reserves and 
production, now and in future; 
iii) Require each MNC to provide 
information filed in all other 
countries of the world, with 
effective sanctions (eg withdrawal 
of registration, fines, etc.) to 
ensure compliance. 
(b) Build regional and Africa-wide 
centers to provide information and 
technical support for national 
governments. These centers would: 
i) collect and disseminate 
information to participating 
governments: 
*re current government 
policies relating to MNCs 
operating in African and other 
Third World countries 
(including contract terms and 
laws, regulations etc); 
*re specific foreign firms: by 
introducing standardised 
registration procedures and 
coordinating collection of 
information on MNC operations 
in Africa; and cooperating 
with other Third World regions 
and countries to obtain 
similar data on foreign firms' 
policies throughout the Third 
World; 
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*on transfer pricing, 
including collection of price 
data, continuing price 
monitoring, etc.; 
ii) Provide technical assistance: 
*in negotiations with or 
regulation of MNCs, either by 
center's own staff; 
consultants from within the 
region (including African 
universities or other 
countries); or outside 
consultants whose expertise 
and loyalty the center has 
vetted; 
*Preparation of model laws, 
regulations and contracts as 
floor for African 
governments' bargaining with 
MNCs; 
*Development of standardised 
accounting principles and 
procedures to apply to 
transnational corporate 
operations; 
*Arrange training for member-
country personnel in relevant 
state institutions dealing 
with MNCs; 
(2) Re technology transfer: To relate 
technology transfer to national and regional 
development strategy, need comprehensive and 
coordinated system of regulation and control 
that extends beyond "laws in the books": 
(a) Establish national, regional andjor 
Africa-wide science and technology 
centers to compile detailed 
technological data-bases and engage in 
technological research and development 
activities to improve national 
technological base, focusing on priority 
areas: 
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eg, at national level, within 
national and regional plans: pole 
of growth industries in energy, 
transport, and machinery and 
equipment, linked to requirements 
of rural development, low-cost 
housing, small-scale industrial and 
artisan enterprises; 
eg, at regional and Africa-wide 
level, energy, transport and pole 
of growth basic industries at 
appropriate levels of technology to 
provide essential inputs to 
increase productivity in all 
sectors of national and regional 
economies. 
(b) Incorporate in national and Africa-
wide codes of investment provisions on 
technological transfer requiring 
investors to impart technological 
innovations and skills to Africans 
through formal and on-the-job training; 
establish research and training programs 
and other methods of facilitating 
technology transfer, and closely monitor 
their progress. 
(c) Diversify sources of technology to 
replace one-source exploitative 
relationships with mutually beneficial 
diversified sources, including smaller 
competitive firms and other-than-MNC 
sources like socialist and other third 
world governments and NGOs. 
(3) Formulation and implementation of 
alternative government banking and financial 
policies to capture and redirect nationally 
and regionally-generated investable surplus 
within planned framework: 
(a) Tax policies: short of direct 
intervention to control banks and 
financial institutions, national 
governments, wherever possible in 
cooperation with each other, should: 
i) implement tax policies based on 
ability to pay, contributing to 
redistribution of income and 
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wealth, in accord with development 
plans; 
ii) establish efficient tax 
systems, based on realistic 
appraisal of practicality and 
enforcement capabilities; 
iii) conduct research to eliminate 
possibly ineffective incentive 
measures (eg accelerated 
depreciation, depletion, and other 
capital-recovery provisions); and 
to prevent tax avoidance through 
transfer pricing; 
iv) Analyze and publish effects of 
tax provisions on sector by sector 
basis; 
v) Obtain and publish foreign tax 
credit provisions of MNC home 
countries to facilitate imposition 
of national and regional taxes that 
do not reduce net return to MNCs; 
vi) Develop continent wide policies 
to avoid competition in granting of 
tax benefits to MNCs. 
(b) If and when resources permit, more 
direct state control of banks and 
financial institutions (typically in 
most African countries managed by MNC 
bankers) may facilitate enforcement of 
measures designed to halt outflow of 
investable surpluses: 
i) egs: 
*Control of banks could 
facilitate supervision of 
MNCs' domestic income and 
expenditures; 
*Banks usually handle foreign 
exchange transactions; state 
monitoring is needed to block 
unwarranted transfers of 
prices; 
ii) These and other aspects of 
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banking and financial institutions 
and policies require research to 
discover in national and regional 
context what government policy 
could be effectively implemented to 
redirect locally-generated 
investable surpluses to finance 
national and regional plans (9 ) • 
(c) Exercise state power to exert 
greater controls to ensure maximum 
foreign exchange earnings and revenues 
from exports and their best possible use 
in buying essential imports in context 
of national and regional plans: 
i) MNCs currently dominate foreign 
and internenal whole sale trade in 
most African states, typically 
exercising their control to foster 
labor intensive and crude exports 
and import of high-profit items not 
appropriate for development, as 
well as transfer price 
ii) Given constraints on state 
personnel, access to marketing 
networks, and information, require 
research relating to best means of 
using state power to restructure 
pattern of foreign trade while 
maximizing generation and optimal 
use of foreign exchange earnings: 
(4) Formulation and implementation of 
national, regional and continental investment 
codes to establish a bargaining floor for 
dealing with MNCs in context of development 
plans; 
(a) Code should specifying desired 
characteristics of MNC role - eg: 
i) Number of jobs created; 
9 For discussion of alternative approaches, see A. 
Seidman, Money, Banking and Public Finance in Africa, (London: 
Zed Press, 1986) 
ii) Use of local resources and 
provision of inputs for other 
sectors of the economy; 
iii) Foreign exchange MNC will 
likely generate; 
iv) Imported inputs required; 
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v) Proposed location and impact on 
balanced economic development; 
vi) Appropriateness of technology; 
vii) Expected local value added; 
viii) Whether a pioneer industry; 
ix) Areas of MNC investment 
permitted (others may be reserved 
to state or domestic private 
firms) ; 
(b) The code should specify the 
conditions on which host country will 
permit MNC investment, including: 
i) Local incorporation; 
ii) Agreement on characteristic of 
proposed investment; 
iii) Plan and guidelines for 
initial localization of jobs, and 
annual increase by job category, 
including requirements for fair 
participation in various employment 
categories of all ethnic groups 
(where relevant) and both sexes. 
iv) Plan for training local people 
for all employment categories; 
v) Disclosure to host country of 
technology used in form that makes 
it available for replication in 
host country; 
vi) Annual disclosure to host 
country of all information filed by 
MNC affiliates anywhere in the 
world; 
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vii) Minimum proportion of capital 
MNC must provide from foreign 
sources; 
viii)Limitations on local 
borrowing; 
ix) Requirements for (or limits on 
use) of local material resources; 
x) Extent of participation by local 
or government investors and, where 
appropriate, the minimum amount of 
that sort of investment required; 
xi) Compliance with host country's 
marketing, recruitment, purchasing, 
and transport policies (including 
sanctions against South Africa) ; 
xii) Reinvestment of stated minimum 
of surpluses in host country (with 
government approval; may be limited 
to government bonds with proceeds 
to go to productive investment) ; 
xiii) Agreement that MNC will abide 
by host country laws (unless 
otherwise stated by the code), and 
litigate disputes with host 
government in host country's courts 
in accord with host country laws; 
xiv) Annual reports disclosing 
sufficient information to permit 
implementing authority to ensure 
compliance with original statement 
of proposed investment and 
conditions of entry. 
(c) Investment and investor compliance 
code should create an enforcement 
authority: 
i) Authority should grant 
certificates of admission to MNC 
investors, which -- since the 
greater the discretion, the greater 
potential for corruption -- defines 
the benefits as far as possible; 
ii) The code should provide an 
appeal or review mechanism from 
decisions of the authority; 
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iii) The authority's decisions 
should receive publicity to reduce 
danger of corruption; 
iv) The authority should have an 
institutionalized relationship to 
the planning authorities to ensure 
MNC investments conform to economic 
plan. 
B. In addition to strengthening African national, regional 
and continental capacity to deal with MNCs, initiatives 
should be taken along similar lines in collaboration 
with other Third World regions: Latin America, Asia, 
and the Middle East: 
1. Various fora already exist: 
a. UNCTAD has provided one forum for this 
approach, though proposals generated for a New 
International Economic Order have proven 
relatively ineffective, primarily due to developed 
country resistance; 
b. Other kinds of cooperative agreements exist, eg 
re specific commodity agreements, like OPEC, those 
for sugar, coffee, etc; but in conditions of the 
crisis these have proved difficult to implement. 
2. Have neither time nor space here, but require 
careful study of the reasons for failures to discover 
what obstacles must be removed to attain increased 
Third World cooperation to bargain more effectively 
with MNCs and their home governments. 
c. Global reach of MNCs, pitting first world workers, wages, 
working conditions and living standards against those in 
Third World, suggests need to develop links with and 
cooperate with peoples' organizations in developed 
countries: 
1. Some examples: 
a. Help to educate their citizens 
(parenthetically, trying to do that through US 
African Studies Association; ASA Task Force is 
seeking cooperation in getting facts to us public 
re crisis and alternative policies for overcoing 
it) 
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b. Trade unions members, in particular, have 
experienced effects of global competition in terms 
of worsening wages, working conditions, national 
social services, and anti-union activities 
Note: us union membership down to 18% of 
total; but confront same MNCs (including now 
from Japan) that African workers and 
governments confront. 
2. Again, need research re existing mechanisms, their 
potential and limits, with a view to improving them in 
order to mobilize world-wide support for controls 
required to ensure that the global management skills, 
capital, technology, and marketing networks, now in 
hands of MNCs contribute to -- and do not undermine 
efforts to achieve improved working and living 
conditions the world around. 
